Revisit the Concept of PEKS: Problems and a Possible Solution by Tang, Qiang
Revisit the Concept of PEKS: Problems and a Possible
Solution
Qiang Tang
Distributed and Embedded Systems Group
Faculty of EWI, University of Twente, the Netherlands
q.tang@utwente.nl
August 28, 2008
Abstract
Since Boneh et al. propose the concept, non-interactive Public-key En-
cryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) has attracted lots of attention from
cryptographers. Non-interactive PEKS enables a third party to test whether
or not a tag, generated by the message sender, and a trapdoor, generated by
the receiver, contain the same keyword without revealing further information.
In this paper we investigate a non-interactive PEKS application proposed by
Boneh et al. and show our observations, especially that privacy is not protected
against a curious server. We propose the notion of interactive PEKS, which, in
contrast to non-interactive PEKS, requires the tag to be generated interactively
by the message sender and the receiver. For this new primitive, we identify two
types of adversaries, namely a curious user and a curious server, and provide
security formulations for the desirable properties. We propose a construction
for interactive PEKS and prove its security in the proposed security model.
1 Introduction
Non-interactive Public-key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS), proposed by
Boneh et al. [6], allows message senders to reposit an encrypted message together
with some tags (encrypted keywords) at a server, where the encryptions are based
on the receiver’s public key; later the receiver may send a token, which is generated
based on the receiver’s private key, to the server so that the latter can search over
the tags attached to each encrypted message. Non-interactive PEKS is also referred
to as searchable encryption in [6]. As a motivation example, Boneh et al. [6] show
that non-interactive PEKS can be used for routing emails in an email system (more
details are in Section 2.2). Among other applications, Waters et al. [30] show that
non-interactive PEKS can be used to build an encrypted and searchable audit log.
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RelatedWork. Abdalla et al. [1] study the issue of consistency for non-interactive
PEKS, provide a transform of an anonymous IBE scheme to a secure non-interactive
PEKS scheme, and propose three extensions, namely anonymous HIBE, public-
key encryption with temporary keyword search, and identity-based encryption with
keyword search. Di Crescenzo and Saraswat [10] propose a non-interactive PEKS
construction based on Jacobi symbols. Khader [16] shows how to construct non-
interactive PEKS based on K-Resilient IBE. Baek, Safavi-Naini, and Susilo [3] dis-
cuss the issues about refreshing keywords, avoiding the secure channel for protecting
trapdoors, and searching on multiple keywords.
There are a number of extentions to the concept of non-interactive PEKS. In the
original definition, the search is only done by comparing the equality of the keywords
contained in the token and tags. Boneh and Waters [7] extend non-interactive PEKS
to support conjunctive, subset, and range comparisons over the keywords. Hwang
and Lee [15] investigate non-interactive PEKS in multiuser setting, where there are
m receivers in the scheme and the m public keys are used to encrypt the keywords.
Implicitly assumed in [6], the public-key encryption scheme and the non-interactive
PEKS scheme share the same key pair but none of the security definitions for these
primitives has taken this into account. The authors in [2, 20] investigate hybrid
models for combining public-key encryption and non-interactive PEKS, where both
primitives share the same public/private key pair.
Besides these follow-ups, non-interactive PEKS is also related to the information
retrieval problem in the private database setting and public database setting. In
the private database setting, a user wishes to upload its private data to a remote
database and wishes to keep the data private from the database. Later, the user must
be able to retrieve from the remote database all records that contain a particular
keyword. Goldreich and Ostrovsky [14] first propose solutions to this problem, and
many follow-ups exist (e.g. [4, 8, 11, 13, 19]). In this setting, the user stores the
encrypted data at the server, hence, it is different from the case of non-interactive
PEKS. In the public setting, a user wants to retrieve data from a database, which
stores data in plaintext, and keep the index of the retrieved data private from the
database. Public Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols, proposed by Chor et al. [9],
are solutions to this problem. Gasarch [12] provides a very detailed summary of PIR
protocols and lower/upper bounds on communication complexity, and Ostrovsky and
Skeith III [17] also provides a summary. In this setting, the database stores data in
plaintext, hence, it is also different from the case of non-interactive PEKS.
Our Contribution. We investigate a non-interactive PEKS application proposed
by Boneh et al. [6] and show a number of observations. We show that the secu-
rity definitions of non-interactive PEKS given in [6] do not match the adversaries
in practice, namely a curious server and a curious message sender. As a result,
the proposed PEKS application cannot provide enough privacy protection for the
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receiver in practice.
As a solution, we propose the notion of interactive PEKS, which, in contrast to
non-interactive PEKS, requires the tag to be generated interactively by the message
sender and the receiver. For this new primitive, we identify two types of adversaries,
namely a curious server and a curious message sender. We provide security formu-
lations for the desirable properties, namely soundness, consistency, and semantic
securities against both types of adversaries. We propose a construction for interac-
tive PEKS which is derived from the pairing-based non-interactive PEKS scheme
given in [6]. The proposed scheme achieves semantic security against the a curious
server in the random model, and achieves semantic security against the a curious
message sender based on the BDH assumption in the random model.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
review the concept of non-interactive PEKS and show that a non-interactive PEKS
scheme cannot provide necessary privacy protection for the receiver. In Section 3 we
introduce the concept of interactive PEKS and provide the security definitions. In
Section 4 we propose a construction for interactive PEKS and prove its security. We
also provide some further remarks on the definition and construction of interactive
PEKS. In Section 5 we conclude the paper.
2 Review the Concept of PEKS
In this section we review the concept of non-interactive PEKS and present our
observations on the related security concerns through a case study.
2.1 Current Security Model for Non-interactive PEKS
A non-interactive PEKS scheme mainly involves the following entities: message
senders, a receiver, and a server. Formally, a non-interactive PEKS scheme consists
of the following polynomial time randomized algorithms:
• KeyGen(k): Run by the receiver, this algorithm takes a security parameter k
as input and generates a public/private key pair (Apub, Apriv).
• PEKS(Apub,W ): Run by a message sender, this algorithm takes Apub and a
keyword W as input and outputs a tag S for W .
• Trapdoor(Apriv,W ): Run by the receiver, this algorithm takes Apriv and a
keyword W as input and outputs a trapdoor TW .
• Test(Apub, S, TW ′): Run by the server, this algorithm takes Apub, S, and TW ′
as input, where
S = PEKS(Apub,W ), TW ′ = Trapdoor(Apriv,W ′),
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and outputs 1 if W =W ′ and 0 otherwise.
With a non-interactive PEKS scheme, the workflow of the underlying application
consists of two types of operations. More details can be found in Section 2.2.
1. The first operation is that, a message sender encrypts his message, runs PEKS
to generate some tags (encrypted keywords) for the message, and reposits the
ciphertext and the tags at the server. It is assumed that a tag is generated for
each keyword.
2. The second operation is that, the receiver runs Trapdoor to generate a trapdoor
for a certain keyword, sends the trapdoor to the server which will run Test to
search over the tags attached to each encrypted message.
Analogous to the case of public key encryption [5], for non-interactive PEKS,
the semantic security against an adaptive adversary is evaluated by the following
game (as depicted in Figure 1) between a challenger and an adversary A.
1. The challenger runs the KeyGen(k) to generate Apub and Apriv. It gives Apub
to the adversary.
2. The adversary can adaptively ask the challenger for the trapdoor TW for any
keyword W ∈ {0, 1}∗ of his choice.
3. At some point, the adversary A sends the challenger two words W0,W1 on
which it wishes to be challenged. The only restriction is that the adversary did
not previously ask for the trapdoors TW0 and TW1 . The challenger picks a ran-
dom bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives the adversary the challenge Sb = PEKS(Apub,Wb).
4. The adversary can continue to ask for the trapdoor TW for any keyword W of
his choice as long as it is not W0 and W1.
5. Eventually, the adversary A outputs b′.
1. (Apub, Apriv)
$← KeyGen(k)
2. (W0,W1)
$←A(Trapdoor)(Apub)
3. b $← {0, 1};Sb $← PEKS(Apub,Wb)
4. b′ $←A(Trapdoor)(Apub, Sb)
Figure 1: Semantic Security of Non-interactive PEKS
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Definition 1. A non-interactive PEKS scheme is semantically secure if any poly-
nomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the above game, where the
advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
If a non-interactive PEKS scheme achieves semantic security, it means that the
adversary cannot determine whether or not two tags contain the same keyword
without knowing the related trapdoors. Boneh et al. [6] show that a semantically
secure non-interactive PEKS scheme implies a chosen ciphertext secure identity-
based public key encryption scheme. However, we note that the adversary (as defined
in the above game) does not correspond to any type of “real adversary” against a
non-interactive PEKS scheme in practice. We demonstrate this in the following
subsection and formally address this issue in Section 3.
Besides the semantic security, soundness and consistency are also important con-
cerns. The soundness attribute says that the value of Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ), TW ′)
should should be 1 if W =W ′, and the consistency attribute says that the value of
Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ), TW ′) should be 0 if W 6= W ′. The consistency attribute
of PEKS has been extensively studied by Abdalla et al. [1]. We skip the details here
and present the definitions in Section 3.2.
2.2 Observations on Non-interactive PEKS
We first restate the email routing example, which has been used as the motivation
for non-interactive PEKS by Boneh et al. [6], and then describe our observations.
Suppose that, in an email system, for a user Alice, her emails are created
by various people and encrypted using her public key. Suppose also that
some keywords are encrypted and attached to Alice’s emails. The main
goal is to enable Alice to give the email server the ability to test whether
a certain keyword has been attached to the email, but the server should
learn nothing else about the email.
With a PEKS scheme, Boneh et al. propose the following solution. Alice gen-
erates a pair (Apub, Apriv). If Bob wants to send a message M with keywords
W1,W2, · · · ,Wn to Alice, he sends
Encrypt(Apub,M),PEKS(Apub,W1),PEKS(Apub,W2), · · · ,PEKS(Apub,Wn).
If Alice wants to retrieve all the emails containing the keywordW , she gives the email
server a trapdoor TW . According to the definition of PEKS, given PEKS(Apub,Wi)
and TW the server can test whether Wi = W . Hence, the email server can identify
all the emails which contain the keyword W and route them later.
With respect to this solution, Alice needs to publish all her keywords. Note that,
for an email system, we assume Alice does not know Bob in advance. If Alice does
not publish her keywords, then Bob cannot attach a useful tag that can be used by
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the server to perform the test. Furthermore, it is reasonable to generally assume
that the server publishes a polynomial number of keywords in non-interactive PEKS
shcemes.
Based on the above observation, we have the following security concerns.
1. In the above solution, it is unclear whether or not the privacy of message M
is achieved even if the public-key encryption scheme is secure. The reason is
that both primitives, namely the public-key encryption scheme and the PEKS
scheme, share the same key pair but none of the security definitions for these
primitives has taken this into account. In fact, this problem has motivated the
formulation of hybrid models in [2, 20].
2. Given a trapdoor, the server can recover the corresponding keyword based
on the assumption that the keyword set is public and polynomial size in the
security parameter. To do this, the server can generate a tag for each keyword
and test it with the trapdoor at hand. This means there is no privacy over the
keywords contained in her emails against a curious server. We can conclude
that the above solution can only provide very limited privacy guarantee for
the receiver, especially against a curious server.
3. There might be an inference attack in this solution. Suppose a message sender
Eve has reposited Encrypt(Apub,M),PEKS(Apub,W ) at the server. If he notices
the receiver has retrieved his message and another message from Bob, then he
can determine that Bob has sent a message containing the same keyword W .
As a result, we should assume there is a secure link between the server and
the message receiver for the retrieval process (the transmission of both the
trapdoors and retrieved messages). Note that the protection of trapdoor is
not enough here, which means that the proposal of Baek, Safavi-Naini, and
Susilo [3] might also suffer from the inference attack.
In this context of email routing, the security definitions of non-interactive PEKS
given in Section 2.1 do not match the possible adversaries, namely a curious server
and a curious message sender. As a result, the proposed solution cannot provide
enough privacy protection for the receiver in practice.
3 The Concept of Interactive PEKS
In this section we first introduce the concept of interactive PEKS and then present
the formal security definitions.
3.1 Introduction to the Concept
Just the same as in the case of non-interactive PEKS, an interactive PEKS scheme
also involves the following entities: message senders, a receiver, and a server. The
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observations in Section 2.2 show that, given a trapdoor, the server can run PEKS to
generate a tag for each keyword and then run Test to find out the keyword related to
the trapdoor. In order to protect the privacy for the receiver against a curious server,
the server should not be able to generate the trapdoor by itself. One possible way
to achieve this goal is making PEKS an interactive algorithm which is run between
a message sender and the receiver, such that a message sender cannot compute a
meaningful tag by himself. Hence, we propose a primitive called interactive PEKS,
which is different from the non-interactive PEKS in that the algorithm PEKS is an
interactive one.
Formally, an interactive PEKS scheme consists of the following polynomial time
randomized algorithms:
• KeyGen(k): Run by the receiver, this algorithm takes a security parameter k
as input and generates a public/private key pair (Apub, Apriv). We assume that
the information about the keyword set is included in Apub.
• PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv): Run between a message sender and the receiver, this
algorithm takes Apub and a keyword W from the message sender and Apriv
from the receiver as input, and outputs a tag S for W .
• Trapdoor(Apriv,W ): Run by the receiver, this algorithm takes Apriv and a
keyword W as input and outputs a PEKS trapdoor TW .
• Test(Apub, S, TW ′): Run by the server, this algorithm takes Apub, S, and TW ′
as input, where
S = PEKS(Apub,W ), TW ′ = Trapdoor(Apriv,W ′),
and outputs 1 if W =W ′ and 0 otherwise.
The algorithm PEKS can be considered as a secure two-party function between
a message sender and the receiver. Compared with the original definition, the only
difference here is that PEKS is an interactive algorithm between a message sender
and the receiver.
Before describing the security definitions for interactive PEKS, we first describe
our assumptions.
1. Due to the observation in Section 2.2, we assume the key pair (Apub, Apriv) is
only used for the interactive PEKS but not for general public-key encryption
services. In other words, the receiver should should employ another key pair
to achieve the general encryption service. Compared with the hybrid models
in [2, 20], a separate discussion for these primitives has many advantages. For
example, we can study both primitives separately and design solutions with
them using a modular approach.
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2. The public keyword set is W of cardinality N , where N ≥ 2 is an integer and
every keyword is a binary string. Without loss of generality, we can further
assume N is a polynomial in the security parameter k.
3. The communication link between the receiver and the server is secure in both
confidentiality and integrity. This assumption is essential to prevent inference
attacks against curious message senders. In fact, this kind of assumption is
widely adopted in other types of protocols. For example, in the multi-database
PIR protocols [9], it is implicitly assumed that a curious database cannot
observe the communication between the user and any other database.
4. The server cannot be a message sender and there is no collusion between mes-
sage senders and the server. The server should delete the tokens immediately
after the Test operation, but it does not need to keep the tags (and the en-
crypted messages) private.
3.2 Security Definitions
Soundness and consistency. The soundness attribute says that, for any key-
words W and W ′, the value of Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ), TW ′) should be 1 if W =
W ′.
Definition 2. An interactive PEKS scheme is sound if the probability P is negligible,
where
P = max
W
Pr[Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv),Trapdoor(Apriv,W )) = 0]
The consistency attribute says that, for any keywords W and W ′, the value of
Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ), TW ′) should be 0 if W 6=W ′.
Definition 3. An interactive PEKS scheme is computationally consistent if the
probability P is negligible, where
P = max
W 6=W ′
Pr[Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv),Trapdoor(Apriv,W ′)) = 1]
The main functionality of an interactive PEKS scheme is to enable message
senders to reposit encrypted messages and related tags at the server, and the receiver
can retrieve a certain encrypted message by asking the server to search on the tags
attached to each encrypted message. We identify two types of adversaries, namely
a curious server and a curious message sender.
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Semantic security against a curious server. A curious server has access to
the encrypted messages and the related tags from message senders, as well as the
trapdoors from the receiver. The main aim of this type of adversary is to learn
some information about the keywords contained in the tags and tokens attached to
some encrypted message. Since the adversary can run Test to match the keywords
contained in a tag and a token, it is sufficient to model the security by evaluating
the adversary’s capability to distinguish the encrypted keywords in tags only.
Note that in practice, for the server, the distribution of keywords in the received
tags might not be uniform at random and so is for the distribution of keywords
in the received tokens. However, for the simplicity of discussion, we assume that
the keyword distribution is uniform in the tag generation and the token generation
processes.
The attack game for semantic security is depicted in Figure 2. For the PEKS
oracle, the adversary does not need to provide any input, the challenger samples a
keyword uniformly at random and returns PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv). For the Trapdoor
oracle, the adversary does not need to provide any input, the challenger samples
a keyword uniformly at random and returns the trapdoor Trapdoor(Apriv,W ). In
contrast to the definition for non-interactive PEKS, as shown in Figure 1, W0 and
W1 are allowed to be issued to Trapdoor in this definition.
1. (Apub, Apriv)
$← KeyGen(k)
2. (W0,W1)
$←A(PEKS,Trapdoor)(Apub)
3. b $← {0, 1};Sb $← PEKS(Apub,Wb;Apriv)
4. b′ $←A(PEKS,Trapdoor)(Apub, Sb)
Figure 2: Semantic security against a curious server
Definition 4. An interactive PEKS scheme achieves semantic security against a
curious server if any polynomial time adversary has only a negligible advantage in
the above game, where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
Semantic security against a curious message sender. We consider a general
environment where the communication link between a message sender and the server
may not be secured and the server may keep all encrypted messages and the related
tags in public. Under this assumption, a curious message sender has access to the
encrypted messages and the related tags from all message senders, as well as the
information gained from the tag generation process, i.e. the executions of PEKS.
The main aim of this type of adversary is also to learn some information about the
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keywords contained in the tags attached to some encrypted message. Compared
with the a curious server, here the adversary does not have access to any token.
The attack game is depicted in Figure 3. For the PEKS oracle, the adversary
chooses a keyword at its will and runs PEKS interactively with the challenger to
compute PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv). However, in generating the challenge Sb, the chal-
lenger chooses Wb and does the computation alone. In contrast to the definition
for non-interactive PEKS, as shown in Figure 1, the adversary has no access to the
Trapdoor oracle in this definition.
1. (Apub, Apriv)
$← KeyGen(k)
2. (W0,W1)
$←A(PEKS)(Apub)
3. b $← {0, 1};Sb $← PEKS(Apub,Wb;Apriv)
4. b′ $←A(PEKS)(Apub, Sb)
Figure 3: Semantic security against a curious message sender
Definition 5. An interactive PEKS scheme achieves semantic security against a
curious message sender if any polynomial time adversary has only a negligible ad-
vantage in the above game, where the advantage is defined to be |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
4 A Construction of Interactive PEKS
In this section we propose a pairing-based interactive PEKS scheme and prove its
security.
4.1 A Preliminary of Pairing
We review the necessary knowledge about pairing and the related assumptions. More
detailed information can be found in the seminal paper [6]. A pairing (or, bilinear
map) satisfies the following properties:
1. G and G1 are two multiplicative groups of prime order p;
2. g is a generator of G;
3. eˆ : G × G → G1 is an efficiently-computable bilinear map with the following
properties:
• Bilinear: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z∗p, we have eˆ(ua, vb) = eˆ(u, v)ab.
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• Non-degenerate: eˆ(g, g) 6= 1.
As defined in [6], G is said to be a bilinear group if the group action in G can
be computed efficiently and there exists a group G1 and an efficiently-computable
bilinear map eˆ as above.
The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem in G is as follows: given a tuple
g, ga, gb, gc ∈ G as input, output eˆ(g, g)abc ∈ G1. An algorithm A has advantage ²
in solving BDH in G if
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc) = eˆ(g, g)abc] ≥ ².
Similarly, we say that an algorithm A has advantage ² in solving the decision BDH
problem in G if
|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, eˆ(g, g)abc) = 0]− Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T ) = 0]| ≥ ².
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Z∗p, the random choice of
T ∈ G1, and the random bits of A.
Definition 6. We say that the (decision) (t, ²)-BDH assumption holds in G if no
t-time algorithm has advantage at least ² in solving the (decision) BDH problem in
G.
Given a security parameter k, a problem (say, BDH) is said to be intractable if
any adversary has only negligible advantage in reasonable time. We usually define a
scheme to be secure if any adversary has only a negligible advantage in the underlying
security model. The time parameter is usually ignored.
Definition 7. The function P (k) : Z → R is said to be negligible if, for every
polynomial f(k), there exists an integer Nf such that P (k) ≤ 1f(k) for all k ≥ Nf .
4.2 Proposed Construction of Interactive PEKS
We construct an interactive PEKS scheme based on pairing. Our construction is
derived from the non-interactive PEKS scheme by Boneh et al. [6]. The algorithms
are defined as follows.
• KeyGen(k): This algorithm generates two cyclic groups G and G1 of prime
order p, a generator g of G, a bilinear map eˆ : G × G → G1, α, β ∈R Z∗p, and
two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. The public key
is Apub = (G,G1, p, g,H1,H2, eˆ, gα) and the private key is Apriv = (α, β).
• PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv): This interactive algorithm works as follows:
1. The message sender selects r ∈R Z∗p and sends (gr,W ) to the receiver as
a request.
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2. After receiving (gr,W ), the receiver sends S′2 to the message sender, where
S′2 = eˆ(g
r, gH2(W ||β)).
3. After receiving S′2, the message sender outputs a tag S for W , where
S1 = gr, S′′2 = eˆ(H1(W ), gα)r, S = (S1, S2).
S2 = S′2 · S′′2
= eˆ(gr, gH2(W ||β)) · eˆ(H1(W ), gα)r
= eˆ(gr, gH2(W ||β) · H1(W )α)
• Trapdoor(Apriv,W ): This algorithm outputs a trapdoor TW for W , where
TW = H1(W )α · gH2(W ||β).
• Test(Apub, S, TW ′): With the input Apub, S, TW ′ , where S1 = gr,
S2 = eˆ(H1(W ), gα)r · eˆ(gr, gH2(W ||β)), TW ′ = H1(W ′)α · gH2(W ′||β),
this algorithm outputs 1 if S2 = eˆ(S1, TW ′) and 0 otherwise.
From the above description, the following equation holds for any W .
Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv),Trapdoor(Apriv,W )) = 1
Therefore, the scheme is sound unconditionally.
Lemma 1. The proposed scheme is consistent in the random oracle model.
Proof sketch. For any W 6=W ′, the following equation
Test(Apub,PEKS(Apub,W ;Apriv),Trapdoor(Apriv,W ′)) = 1
means
eˆ(gr, gH2(W ||β) · H1(W )α) = eˆ(gr,H1(W ′)α · gH2(W ′||β)) for r ∈R Z∗q .
Since H1 and H2 are modeled as random oracles, the probability that the above
equation holds is 1q−1 . Since
1
q−1 is negligible, the lemma holds.
Lemma 2. The proposed scheme achieves semantic security against a curious server
in the random oracle model.
Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary A has the non-negligible advantage ² in the
attack game depicted in Figure 2. The security proof is done through a sequence of
games [18].
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Game0: In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol execution
and answers the oracle queries from A. We assume the challenger simulates the
random oracles as follows. For H1, the challenger maintains a list of vectors, each of
them containing a request message, an element ofG (the hash-code for this message),
and an element of Z∗p. After receiving a request message, the challenger first checks
its list to see whether the request message is already in the list. If the check succeeds,
the challenger returns the stored element of G; otherwise, the challenger returns gy,
where y a randomly chosen element of Z∗p, and stores the new vector in the list.
For H2, the challenger maintains a list of vectors, each of them containing a request
message and an element of Z∗p (the hash-code for this message). After receiving a
request message, the challenger first checks its list to see whether the request message
is already in the list. If the check succeeds, the challenger returns the stored element
of Z∗p; otherwise, the challenger returns u which is a randomly chosen element of
Z∗p, and stores the new vector in the list. Let δ0 = Pr[b′ = b], as we assumed at the
beginning, |δ0 − 12 | = ².
Game1: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game0 except
for the following: the challenger selects W ′0,W ′1 before starting the game and aborts
if W ′0 6=W0 or W ′1 6=W1 in the game. Since the keyword set has the cardinality N ,
the probability that the challenger does not abort is 1N(N−1) . Let δ1 = Pr[b
′ = b]
given that the challenger successfully ends, in which case δ1 = δ0. Let θ1 be the
probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in Game1, then we have
θ1 = δ1N(N−1) .
Game2: In this game, the challenger performs in the same way as in Game1
except for answering the following two types of oracles in Step 2 and 4 of the game
(depicted in Figure 2).
1. PEKS: The challenger first samples W . If W = W ′0, the challenger returns
PEKS(Apub,W ′1;Apriv); ifW =W ′1, the challenger returns PEKS(Apub,W ′0;Apriv).
2. Trapdoor: The challenger first samples W . If W =W ′0, the challenger returns
Trapdoor(Apriv,W ′1); if W =W ′1, the challenger returns Trapdoor(Apriv,W ′0).
The game Game2 is identical to Game1 except that the event E1 occurs: the adversary
queries H2 with the input ∗||β or ∗||β, where ∗ is any string. Since H1 is modeled as
a random oracle, the probability Pr[E1] is negligible because β is a secret. When E1
does not occur, let δ2 = Pr[b′ = b] given that the challenger successfully ends and θ2
be the probability that the challenger successfully ends and b′ = b in Game2. We have
θ2 = δ2N(N−1) . Since Game2 only differs from Game1 when E1 occurs, then we have
|θ2 − θ1| ≤ Pr[E1], i.e. | δ2N(N−1) − δ1N(N−1) | ≤ Pr[E1]. On the other hand, if E1 does
not occur, we have δ2 = 1− δ1. As a result, we have | 1−δ1N(N−1) − δ1N(N−1) | ≤ Pr[E1], so
that |δ0− 12 | ≤ 12N(N−1)Pr[E1], i.e. ² ≤ 12N(N−1)Pr[E1]. Since N is a polynomial
in the security parameter k and Pr[E1] is negligible, the lemma now follows.
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Compared with the original scheme in [6], the receiver has an additional secret
β in the proposed scheme. The computations involved with this secret make the
secheme secure against a curious server. By removing these computations, we will
obtain the original scheme in [6]. On the other hand, the adversary has less privilege
in the semantic security definition against a curious message sender than in the
original definition, without considering β. From the security proof by Boneh et al.
(i.e. Theorem 3.1 in [6]) we immediately get the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The proposed scheme achieves semantic security against a curious mes-
sage sender based on the BDH assumption assumption in the random oracle model.
4.3 Some Remarks on Interactive PEKS
According to our definition for the algorithm PEKS in Section 3.1, the receiver is
required to be online to for each execution. This is certainly a burden for the receiver
in practice. In practice, this requirement can be relaxed in many ways. For example,
1. One way is that the receiver can ask every message sender to keep a copy of
β. With this method, if a message sender is compromised then the security is
compromised.
2. Another way is that the receiver can find a trusted third party and stores β
and the message sender interactively executes the algorithm with it.
In addition, for every keyword, it may be possible that the message sender to run
PEKS only once with the receiver and regenerate a new tag later by itself. Consider
the proposed scheme in Section 4.2. For any keyword W , the tag is S = (S1, S2),
where S1 = gr, S2 = eˆ(gr, gH2(W ||β) ·H1(W )α) for some r ∈ Z∗p. With S, the message
sender can generate a new tag for W as S′ = Sr′ = (Sr′1 , Sr
′
2 ) where r ∈R Z∗p. The
outcome is exactly the same as in the case where the message sender runs PEKS
with the receiver.
When introducing the concept of interactive PEKS in Section 3.1, we explicitly
make the following assumption: The server cannot be a message sender and there is
no collusion between message senders and the server. In practice, this assumption
may be unrealistic in some applications, in which case we can generally assume that
the server colludes with message senders Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Informally, the semantic
security definitions may be extended in the following way to cope with the situation.
1. Suppose the colluded message senders Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) run PEKS with the
receiver for keyword setW ′. The semantic security against the a curious server
is identical to that defined in Figure 2, except for an additional restriction that
W0,W1 /∈ W ′.
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2. For the semantic security against colluded message senders Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the
semantic security definition is the same as in the above case for the a curious
server (as they are colluded). For a curious message sender apart from the
colluded message senders Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the semantic security definition is
identical to that described in Figure 3.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the security definitions for non-interactive PEKS
do not match the adversaries in the practical applications. We have proposed the
concept of interactive PEKS as an alternative, categorized the possible adversaries
(namely a curious user and a curious server), and provided the necessary security
definitions. We have also proposed a construction for interactive PEKS and proven
its security in the proposed security model. In practice, the online tag generation
may be a burden for the underlying application, nonetheless, we have pointed out
that a number of methods can be employed to overcome this problem. Note that we
have only defined the semantic securities against a chosen plaintext attack, it is an
interesting future work to define the semantic securities against a chosen ciphertext
attack and provide corresponding protocol constructions.
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